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In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States saw an unprecedented economic 
development which turned the country into the world’s first economic power. The United States began 
to outperform the economic leader of that time – Great Britain – and became the destination of millions 
of people looking for opportunities to improve their well-being. Ultimately, the United States became 
a model of a successful economy soon to be studied by other countries. The economic development 
manifested itself by the rapid advance of existing industries, the dawn of new industries and the creation 
of a large transportation and distributional network which gradually integrated the national market. This 
economic development, however, was not equally spread. On the contrary, regions with high 
concentration of industries emerged alongside regions with low industrial concentration. The first 
divergence of U.S. regions occurred during the early phase of industrialization - manufacturing began 
to concentrate in Northeast and Middle Atlantic whereas the South remained largely agricultural. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century industrialization spread across Northeast, Middle Atlantic, and 
Midwest regions and formed the manufacturing belt, leaving the South predominantly agricultural. The 
twentieth century witnessed a convergence of regional income and industrial structure, though the 
process was uneven and can be viewed as mostly a post-World War II development.  Moreover, 
convergence lasted only until about the 1980s when a slow-down began, and the process even stopped. 
This chapter offers an overview of the main trends of regional economic development in the United 
States between 1880 and 2010 at the state level. It first discusses data sources and a methodology used 
to estimate income per capita of US states before 1920. Various quantitative measures of regional 
inequality are then used to describe 130 years of regional development, attempting to offer a few 
stylized facts about US regional inequalities. After that, a discussion of the existing research offering 
insights into the determinants of unequal distribution of economic activities across the US is presented, 
followed by a conclusion.  
 
 
Methodology and Data Sources 
To analyse the long-term development of US regional inequality, time series of real income per capita 
figures for US states are needed.1 First I discuss the data sources for the nominal income per capita, 
then a price adjustment necessary to derive real income per capita, and finally an adjustment to construct 
an internationally comparable set of regional GDP per capita in 1990 GK$. Well-known figures of 
nominal total personal income per capita provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis are used for 
the years 1930-2010.2 Income per capita figures in 1920 come from Richard Easterlin (1957). Figures 
for 1880-1910 come from Klein (2013) where I followed the pioneering work of Richard Easterlin and, 
using his methodology, calculated states’ nominal per capita income for 1890 and 1910 as well as 
improved his original figures for 1880 and 1900. The main idea of the methodology can be briefly 
described as follows.3 For each state, a ratio of the state total personal income per capita relative to the 
U.S. total personal income per capita is calculated. These ratios are then used to allocate U.S. total 
personal income per capita among the states. The calculation consists of two main steps: estimation of 
the U.S. total personal income per capita by type and industry, and estimation of a ratio of state total 
personal income per capita to the U.S. total personal income per capita. The first stage provides U.S. 
total personal income per capita, and U.S. total personal income per capita by its type. There are two 
types of income: so-called service income which includes wages, salaries, and proprietor’s income, and 
so-called property income consisting of rental income, personal interest income, and dividends.  The 
second stage calculates state total personal income per capita relative to U.S. total personal income per 
capita, which is done by summing state total service income per capita relative to U.S. total service 
income per capita and state total property income per capita relative to U.S. total property income per 
capita. The calculation of each of those ratios forms a complex system of mutually dependent equations 
and the result is total personal income per capita for each US state.4 
                                                          
1
 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. 
2
 The Bureau of Economic Analysis also provides real Gross State Product (GSP) figures, but they run from 
1963 only.  
3
 Full details of the methodology is discussed in Klein (2013). 
4
 We do not have data for Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota in 1880. 
To derive the real total personal income per capita of each US states, the nominal figures need to be 
adjusted for changes in price levels. This presents a challenge. Ideally, we would like to adjust the 
nominal figures across time as well as across space. However, we do not have price indices for each US 
states in 1880-2010. Two options are available. One is to use an US GDP deflator for the period 1880-
2010, the other one is to use a spatial price-adjustment developed by Mitchener and McLean (1999) for 
the years 1880, 1900, 1920, 1940, 1960, and 1980. I used US GDP deflator from Johnston and 
Williamson (2018), adjusting the nominal figures only for temporal prices changes. Leaving spatial 
price-adjustment out does present a problem, but, as shown by Mitchener and McLean (1999), it is not 
that severe. They have shown that even after spatial price-adjustment, the trends in regional personal 
income remain unchanged and the effect of differences in regional price levels is trivial by and after 
1920 (Mitchener and McLean, 1999, page 1026). Since it is illuminating to compare and contrast US 
regional development with regional developments in other countries, an internationally comparable 
regional figure for GDP per capita is needed. In our case, a useful short-cut is to distribute US GDP in 
1990 GK$ calculated by the Maddison Project among the US states using the shares of state’s total 
personal income on the US total personal income. Usual caveats apply here, and I consider those figures 
to be a set of first-generation estimates suitable only for a comparative analysis of long-run trends of 
regional GDP inequalities between the US and other countries. A more detailed calculation of an 
internationally comparable set of estimates of US regional GDP is an important agenda for future 
research. In addition to states’ per capita income data, we use states’ sectoral employment figures to 
provide further description of the main trends in regional inequality.5        
 
Basic facts of regional inequalities 
I will describe general trends in regional income inequality across US states in 1880-2010 along several 
dimensions: GDP per capita, sectoral employment, spatial Gini coefficient, and the concept of σ-
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 Employment figures for 1890 come from Perloff at al (1960), data for 1930, 1950, 1980, and 2010 come from 
the US Censuses and were generously provided by Alexandra Lopez Cermeno. 
converge and β-convergence. Furthermore, I will look at the states’ real per capita personal income 
relative to the US and I will consider patterns across US states as well as more broadly defined US 
regions. All this will allow to us to shed some first light on an undoubtedly complex process of regional 
development over the course of 130 years.   
Figure 1 presents trends of states’ GDP per capita between 1880 and 2010. We see that the (population 
weighted) average increased by about 850%, with the largest increase occurring after the World War 
II. Interestingly, the distance between the poorest and the richest US states was quite stable, beginning 
to widen considerably only since 1980s. As an example, the richest state in 1880 was the mining sector 
driven Nevada, the poorest was North Carolina while Mississippi was the poorest state in 2010 and 
Connecticut the richest one. Sectoral employment figures offer another angle when examining long-run 
regional inequality. Figure 2 plots the evolution of the sectoral employment shares between 1890 and 
2010. The trends are clear: agriculture has been losing its dominant position at the expense of 
manufacturing and services. The service sector has been an important source of employment since the 
interwar years and Figure 2 strongly suggests that the structural change unfolding during the twentieth 
has been as much a services story as it was an industry story. To get a better sense of the changes in the 
location of employment in those broad sectors across US states, Figure 3 presents the coefficient of 
variation of location quotients, as defined in the chapter by Roses and Wolf. We see that already in 
1890, the industrial sector was quite regionally concentrated. The subsequent evolution of all three 
sectors shows a clear pattern of spatial localization of agriculture, and dispersion of industry and 
services respectively. All this is suggestive of spatially uneven development of the US economy over 
the past 130 years. This conjecture is confirmed in Figure 4 which shows the development of a 
locational Gini coefficients measuring the extent of unequal distribution of GDP across US states. We 
see an interesting picture of relatively stable regional inequalities when we compare location Gini 
coefficient and 1880 and 2010. In between, however, we see a sign of what can be broadly considered 
an inverted U-shape curve. This indicates a rise of regional inequalities until 1930s and their subsequent 
decline, though not enough to consider regional inequalities in 2010 being very less pronounced than 
in 1880.  This, at first, might look to be at odds with the dispersion of employment across US states as 
captured in Figure 3. However, while the dispersion of employment in industries and services might be 
an indication of the process potentially leading to more equal distribution of economic activities across 
US states, it might have been only related to the decline of regional inequalities since their peak in 
1930s. 
The concepts of convergence arise from neoclassical models of economic growth. The concept of β-
convergence tells us that a poor region will have a tendency to grow faster than the average, enabling it 
to catch up with the rich and even out regional disparities. Here we concentrate on β-unconditional 
convergence. The concept of σ-converge is related to the cross-sectional dispersion of regional income 
and convergence occurs if the dispersion – measured by, for example standard deviation, or coefficient 
of variation of per capita income across regions – declines over time. Table 1 presents population-
weighted coefficients of variation of GDP per capital across US states between 1880 and 2010. The 
following basic facts emerge. Overall, regional inequality has a declining trend, though four sub-periods 
can be identified: 1880-1920, 1920-1940, 1940-1980, and 1980-2010. The first period shows a clear 
decline in regional inequality while the interwar period years (1920-1940) reversed this trend and 
regional inequality actually increased by 1930. The post-World War II period witnessed a rather strong 
regional convergence. This came to a halt by the 1980s and since then, regions began to diverge, 
something that was already visible in Figure 1 and can also be observed in Europe. Given the importance 
of the western regions and the South in the US regional development, I also calculated the coefficients 
of variation excluding those two regions respectively, see Table 1. Looking at the pattern of regional 
inequality excluding the West we see that the overall trend is preserved, and the post-1980 period 
suggests an even more profound increase in regional inequality. When we exclude the South, the overall 
trend is, again preserved though the coefficients of variation dropped considerably, much more than 
when excluding the West. An interesting feature emerges from the period 1940-1980. Unlike in the 
other two cases, the pattern of regional convergence, though still decreasing, is rather subdued, even 
flat in the 1950s and 1960s. This suggests, and quite strongly, that the South played a considerable role 
in diminishing regional inequalities in the post-World War II area as will be explored below.  
The concept of β-unconditional convergence can shed further light on the patterns and possible drivers 
of regional inequality and convergence.6 Figures 1-4 depict per capita average annual real growth rates 
against the logarithm of initial per capita values (both calculated using per capita figures in 1990 GK$) 
for the periods 1880-2010, 1880-1940, 1940-2010 and 1920-1940 respectively. We see that in all but 
one period – 1920-1940 – regional convergence follows a well-known pattern of β-unconditional 
convergence: US states with higher initial per capita income have lower growth rates than the states 
with per capita income on the opposite side of per capita spectrum. Looking more closely at the 
differences between the figures, we can clearly observe the changing role of the western states in 
convergence over time. Specifically, Figure 1 shows that the states with the highest per capita income 
and, subsequently the lowest growth rates in 1880-2010, are the western states. Figure 2, depicting the 
period 1880-1940, makes the importance of the western states even more visible. Indeed, they create 
almost a separate cluster. That picture changes when we look at Figure 3 showing β-unconditional 
convergence for the period 1940-2010. We see that, as suggested in Table 1, the West ‘looses’ its 
dominant role in explaining the patterns of post-World War II regional inequality and it is only the state 
of California and Nevada which remain the ‘club’ of high per capita real income. However, this time 
they are together with the state of Delaware, New York, or Connecticut. The importance of the South 
can be also observed in those figures, most visibly in Figure 3 where the southern states (together with 
North and South Dakota) are at the upper spectrum of US states with low initial per capita income but 
high subsequent growth rates.           
The last piece of evidence helping us to describe (and also further fine-tune) basic patterns of regional 
inequality is the states’ real per capita personal income relative to the US real per capita income, 
presented in Table 2. The table presents not only figures for each US state in 1880-2010, but also for 
four US regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), and the manufacturing belt and the rest of the US.7 
Looking at the overall trends across regions in the period 1880-2010, we can distinguish convergence 
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 An extensive analysis of convergence across US states has been done by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992). 
7
 At a disaggregated level, it is appropriate to demarcate the manufacturing belt in terms of counties. Our analysis 
is at the state level; states whose territory is wholly or predominantly in the Manufacturing belt are Connecticut, 
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
‘from above’, ‘from below’ and no convergence. Northeast and West are the regions which per capita 
real income converged to the US average ‘from above’, meaning that their 1880 per capita income was 
higher than the US average. South exhibits convergence ‘from below’ as its per capita in 1880 income 
was only about 50% of the US average. The performance of Midwest region in terms of convergence 
was very stagnant and even though there has been some signs of convergence to the US average in the 
twentieth century as discussed below, overall, the region started with 98% of US average real per capita 
income in 1880 and ended with 95% in 2010 – a sign relative stability over the course of 130 years. It 
is interesting to look at the region of the manufacturing belt because its existence and ultimately 
dissolution in the late decades of the twentieth century played a dominant role in the distribution of 
economic activities in Northeast, Midwest, and South. We see that despite some fluctuations in 1890 
and 1910, the region held a very similar real per capita income relative to the US average in 1880-1940, 
declining until 1980, and then slightly increasing. The rest of the US witnessed an overall upward trend, 
though there has been a significant drop in 1930.  
What about the relative importance of the southern and western regions in explaining the patterns of 
convergence in 1880-2010? As for the West, the numbers in table 2 clearly show that this region 
experienced a profound convergence to the US average real per capita income in the period 1880-1940, 
figures dropping from 92% to 19% above the US average.8 Comparing that with Northeast and 
Midwest, it is clear that the western states played a dominant position in diminishing US regional 
inequalities before 1940. Indeed, the North-eastern states exhibited only slight convergence to the US 
average per capita income, Midwestern states fluctuated around the US average during the entire period 
of 1880-1940. As for South, the region showed only small increase in per capita income which was still 
only 64% of the US average in 1940.  
The period after 1940 witnessed a retraction of West as the main driving region of income converge 
and the South was the main region behind the post-World War II regional convergence as its per capital 
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 The choice of the year 1940 might seem a bit imprecise given that the profound decrease on real per capita 
income relative to the US average ended in 1930. From the point of view of long-run trends in regional inequality, 
the dominant role of the western regions ended in the interwar period and I opted to delineate it with the year 
1940.   
real income raised from 64% in 1940 to 93% in 2010. Northeast’s per capita income embarked on the 
downward trend towards the US average, dropping from 31% above the US average in 1940 to 18% in 
2010. Midwest’s per capita income, again, fluctuated around the US average. It might be interesting to 
compare the manufacturing belt region with Northeast and Midwest. It is a rather rough comparison 
since the manufacturing belt does include a few of the Midwest states, but it still reveals interesting 
points. In the post-World War II decades, per capita income of that region declines relative to the US 
average, but recovers from about 1980s. This seems to be driven by the northeastern states rather than 
Midwest.                 
Before summarizing the main trends in regional inequality over the past 130 years, I will look at the 
evolution of per capita income relative to the US average of a few US states. Examining, for example, 
the state of Illinois, we can observe a pattern closely resembling an inverted U-shape. Indeed, Illinois 
reached its peak before World War I, plateauing in the interwar period and then declining after World 
War II. Michigan, arguably one of the core regions of the Manufacturing belt, also exhibits something 
like an inverted U-shape pattern. Unlike Illinois, it peaks in 1940 and then experienced a steady decline. 
A contrast to those two states are the states of California or Nevada which experienced a steady decline 
of their real per capita income relative to the US average over the entire period of 130 years. On the 
other hand, Florida and Virginia are examples of states with a gradual increase in their real per capital 
income relative to the US, even during the period 1880-1940, which was a period of laggard 
convergence among many southern states. Lastly, despite convergence and diminishing regional 
inequalities over the course of late nineteenth, twentieth, and early twenty first century, some US states 
show a remarkable persistence. There are those which were among the richest in 1880 and remained so 
in 2010 – for example Connecticut and Massachusetts – and there are some which were among poorest 
in 1880 and remained so in 2010 – for example Mississippi and West Virginia.          
Overall, the evolution of regional inequalities in the United States since 1880 can be characterized as 
one of convergence, though not uninterrupted, accompanied by persistent of regional inequalities. 
Indeed, one could even say that 130 years of US regional development were 130 years of “unfulfilled 
convergence”. The period of 1880-1940 was dominated by the West converging to the US average from 
above while the convergence in the period 1940-2010 was driven by the South which was converging 
to the US average from below. The period of 1920-1940 did not witness convergence (quite on the 
contrary) and the post-1980 decades exhibit a considerable slow-down or even and end of convergence. 
It is important to note that though wide-spread, convergence was not universal and we have US states 
which persistently missed out on convergence of their real per capita income to US average. The 
locational Gini coefficient confirms that spatial inequalities were persistently high over the past 130 
years and showed little or no sign of disappearing.   
 
Regional Inequality: Determinants and Causes 
The basic facts about the evolution of regional inequality discussed in the previous section provide a 
spring board to review various explanations trying to understand the driving forces of convergence and 
divergence across US states over the course of 130 years.9 These explanation, as will be seen below, 
are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, putting them together offers us a story of the regional 
economic development and even though it is very likely incomplete, its main characters and their 
contribution to that story has been quite clearly identified. There is a large number of studies 
investigating regional inequalities and causes related to them. Here I will concentrate only on the studies 
which directly examine the forces behind regional development in long-run or for the sub-periods we 
are interested in. There are two main ways how to review this literature: one would be to focus on 
specific US regions, the other would be more guided by theory and centred around the type of 
explanation putting forward by various studies. Here I opt for the latter one since it allows me not only 
to summarize the main sources of long-run regional development but also to identify future avenues of 
research more easily.10  
                                                          
9
 There is a large body of important studies focusing on the issues of the measurement of convergence which are 
not reviewed here (e.g. Rey et al 1999, Yamamoto 2008). 
10
 There is a large body of research analysing regional economic development in the US. Here I focus mostly on 
the studies which attempted to account for a long-run pattern of US regional inequality, leaving some studies with 
narrower time span out. 
Broadly, we can distinguish four different types of explanations which have emerged in the literature 
analysing long-term development US regional income inequalities: factors of production, institutions, 
structural change, resources abundance, and economic geography. Most generally, we can broadly 
distinguish between fundamental drivers of regional inequalities such as institutions and geographical 
characteristics, and factors which can be called ‘proximate’ sources of regional inequalities such as 
factor prices, resource abundance, and structural change.  
Proximate sources of regional inequalities 
Factors of Production 
Inputs of production, especially labor and human capital, received attention from scholars examining 
long-run regional inequalities. Mitchener and McLean (1999) put forward an explanation based on labor 
input and labor productivity in order to account for high levels of per capita income of the West in 1880 
and its subsequent convergence to the US average from above as well as anaemic performance of the 
South. The decomposition of regional differences in per capita income relative to the US average 
revealed that high income of the West in 1880 was not only due to high level of productivity, but also 
due to high level of labor input driven by high percentage of males in the West and age structure which 
favoured high labor force participation rates. This was complemented by the abundance of resources, 
allowing the West to achieve high productivity levels. The subsequent convergence of the West to the 
national average is less understood, and standard explanations of factor mobility or diffusion of 
technology are not entirely convincing (Mitchener and McLean, 1999). It appears that the erosion of 
favourable age structure and gender ratio and resource base might help to explain rather rapid converge 
of the West to the US average. As for sluggish performance of South, Mitchener and McLean (1999) 
find that the main reason was low productivity while labor input does not help to illuminate long and 
persistent underperformance of that region.11 However, low levels of human capita as measured by 
formal educational attainment were found to be important in explaining very slow convergence of the 
southern states before 1950 (Connolly 2004).  
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 See Mitchener and McLean (1999), Table 3, page 1032. 
The slow-down of convergence since 1980s has recently drawn scholarly attention and the role of labor 
migration, demand for skilled labor, and housing market were examined. Research has observed that 
the income differences across US states have been increasingly capitalized into housing prices (e.g. Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), Glaeser et al.(2005)). This, together with a fact that regional economic 
success after 1980 was connected to the rising importance of human capital and demand for high-skilled 
labor due to skill-biased technological change (Autor and Dorn (2013)), has led to an examination of 
the role of housing market in the rising regional inequalities. Ganong at el. (2017) show that the decline 
of income convergence can be explained in part by a change in the relationship between income and 
housing prices. Since housing prices began to account for a far greater proportion of the income 
differences across states after 1980s, the returns to living in productive areas has fallen for unskilled 
households, and their migration patterns diverge from the migration patterns of the skilled households. 
As a result the US economy has shifted from one in which regional labor markets clear through net 
migration to one in which labor markets clear through skill-sorting – high-skilled workers move to high-
income places while low-skilled workers leave high-income places.  
Structural change  
Structural change has been viewed as one of the major forces of economic development.12 Indeed, US 
economic development over 130 years witnessed, among other things, two structural changes: ‘first’ 
structural change when agriculture was losing to manufacturing, and ‘second’ structural change when 
manufacturing was losing to services. A study by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) considers structural 
change as one of the explanations for the observed income convergence across US states. The effect of 
the differences in the sectoral composition of regions on regional income convergence and the process 
of narrowing those differences were examined by Kim (1998) who analysed them at broad SIC 1-digit 
level. Even this rather crude measure of regional industrial structure has already yielded some valuable 
insights in to the factors shaping US long-run development of regional inequalities. Disappointing 
performance of the South before 1940 can be attributed to the unfavourable industrial mix of that region 
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 See, for example, Herrendorf et al. (2014).  
focusing mostly on agriculture while rather spectacular convergence of the US economy from 1940s 
until 1980s can be partly attributed to the narrowing of differences in regional industrial structure.  A 
study by Caselli and Coleman (2001) offers a valuable insight into the role of labor force reallocation 
in the convergence of US regions over the course of 100 years from 1880 to 1980. Their analysis focuses 
on the decomposition of convergence into sectoral labor reallocation effect, convergence of economy 
wide agricultural wages to non-agricultural (so-called between-sector convergence) and convergence 
of southern wages to northern wages within sectors respectively. Several important findings stand out. 
Southern states’ convergence to Northern states before 1940 (or lack of it) was driven mostly by labor 
reallocation out of agriculture and convergence of agricultural to non-agricultural wages. Convergence 
of within-sector wages played a minor role before 1940, but that was reversed after that and the catching 
up of southern wages with northern wages within each sector was the main force behind post World 
War II convergence, accounting for about 40 percent of it. This suggests that an important part of post 
1950 catch up of the South was an increase in labor productivity. Convergence of Midwest to North 
was largely because of agricultural out-migration. Interestingly, structural transformation played no role 
in regional convergence between West and North before 1940 and only a small role after that. Structural 
change has been also a focus of a study by Bernard et al (1996), though it concentrates only on the 
period 1963-1989, which, from the point of view of long-run convergence, includes the decades of both 
rapid and stagnating regional convergence. Also, it does not discuss specifically discuss the role of 
South. Despite the limitation, the findings are illuminating and suggest that structural change has 
contributed to about one quarter of total aggregate convergence though it argues that a shift from 
manufacturing to service sector reduced productivity growth.13 This is rather potentially important 
finding since it implies a growth inhibiting effect of labor reallocation toward services in the 1960s, 
70s, and 80s, known as Baumol disease (Baumol 1967).14 
Though we still lack studies thoroughly examining how labor reallocation from manufacturing to 
services impacted the evolution of regional convergence patterns, it is important to assess the effect of 
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 Bernard et al (1996), page 133. 
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 Similar argument is put forward by Desmet et al (2014). 
the rising of service sector on regional income inequality given the growing importance of this ‘second’ 
structural transformation which started occurring, at least for the vantage point of labor productivity, in 
the middle of 1990s. Recent study by Desmet et al. (2014) attempts, among other things, to link 
structural transformation to regional distribution of economic activities. It shows a gradual increase in 
spatial concentration of services from 1950s as well as the rise of productivity of service sector, which 
began in the mid-1990s. Though still far away from informing us about the causes of regional income 
differences, the study captures the shift of manufacturing activities from the manufacturing belt to 
South, which will be discussed below, and argues for the replacement of manufacturing with service 
sector employment. The result of that study suggests that, given the productivity advances of service 
sector and the relocation of manufacturing employment from Northeast and Midwest to South, we can 
expect that the extend of regional income inequality will depend on how successful regions are in 
attracting high-productivity services and/or replacing manufacturing with service sector.    
Resource abundance 
Another explanation of regional convergence patterns since 1880 which has not drawn much attention 
from scholar is natural resources. This is not to say that the role of natural resources and their abundance 
did not play an important role in the explanations of US industrial success, quite the contrary (see e.g. 
Wright 1990, David and Wright 1997). However, there has been little done when trying to account for 
the long-run convergence patterns of US regions, and especially the effect of resource abundance on 
rapid convergence of the West before 1940, as seen earlier. We can, however, gain some insights from 
a couple of studies attempting to shed some light on the long-run consequences of natural resources, 
even though they do not explicitly address the question of regional convergence. Mitchener and McLean 
(2003) examine the effect of workforce in mining in 1880 on the subsequent income per capita of US 
states, only to find a positive association until 1920. This is suggestive of natural resources playing a 
positive role in at least high initial per capita income of resource abundance states in West, possibly 
persisting until the interwar period. Michaels (2011) investigates the long-run impact of oil abundance 
in the South. The results are interesting and indicate that by the middle of the twentieth century, oil 
sector increased per capita income and education in oil abundant counties of the US South. That effect, 
however, dissipated by 1990. Hence, they suggest that oil extraction did not necessarily constrained the 
economic development of the South before 1940, but also did not necessarily help to spur the growth 
in the post-World War II are. Altogether, both studies suggest a plausible story of natural resources 
having a positive impact on regional economic development in late nineteenth century and possibly 
until about 1950, but rather muted effect after that. Still, while highly suggestive and important, we still 
do not know exactly the role of natural resource in the sluggish convergence of South and rapid 
convergence of West as well as the transmission channels of their influence. Recently, a study by 
Papyrakis et al. (2007) seems to be a rare case examining the effect of natural resources on GSP (Gross 
State Product) convergence across US states. Even though it focuses on a shorter time span including 
the years of 1986-2000, those are the years which were identified earlier as the years of a stagnating 
regional convergence, which is suggestive of a potentially detrimental effect of natural resources on 
regional convergence. Their findings suggest that natural resources did not affect economic growth as 
such, hence there is no evidence of natural resource course. However, natural resources had a negative 
impact on investment, schooling, R&D, and openness, and increased corruption which suggests that 
natural resources might be one of the reasons for economic underperformance of resource abundant 
regions in the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
Fundamental sources of regional inequalities 
Institutions 
Institutions are considered as one of the fundamental factors affecting long-run economic performance. 
Similarly, institutions can be considered as one of the fundamental causes of long-run regional 
inequalities. There is an extensive literature stressing the importance of specific southern institutions 
on the American economic development before and especially after the Civil War (e.g. Wright 1986, 
2006). Indeed, the effect of the Civil War and the institution of slavery were considered as the primary 
reasons for the laggard performance of the southern regions. It has been argued that the legacy of slavery 
and especially dependence on large plantations left the South vulnerable to the slow adoption of new 
technology and industrialization necessary to catch up the rest of the United States. In particular, the 
South witnessed low investment into physical capital and lack of labor supply for prospective 
manufacturing industries. Factor markets did not play a favourable role either. Out migration of 
educated black population not only lowered human capital levels in the South, but also limited 
intergenerational effect that educated black population would have had it remained in the South (Margo 
1988). Recently, a few studies have attempted to empirically test a link between slavery in the US South 
and regional inequalities at the end of the twentieth century. Nunn (2008) found that all forms of slavery, 
not only large plantations, negatively affected economic development at the end of the twentieth, though 
this adverse effect was not due to initial economic inequality. He finds that land inequality in 1860 is 
uncorrelated with income in 2000 and suggests that it can be due to the catch-up process the South 
started in the 1940s. Bertocchi et al (2014) examine the effect of slavery on income inequality across 
US counties and find a robust negative correlation. They also try to examine channels through which 
slavery affected inequality across US counties and argue that unequal educational attainment of blacks 
and whites is a crucial channel through which is slavery related to inequality across US counties.  
Economic Geography 
As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, US regions experienced a rather dramatic shift of 
manufacturing activities from Northeast and Midwest, and specifically a region called manufacturing 
belt, to South (e.g. Holmes et al 2004). Though dramatic in its scope, it was less dramatic in its speed 
as it took about a century for the manufacturing to start noticeably relocating to the southern states. This 
affected the development of regional inequalities because in many states manufacturing was a dominant 
sector until service sector started to gain on importance since about 1990s.  
Our discussion has already pointed out the existence and potential importance of the manufacturing 
belt. This term has long been used to describe the remarkable spatial concentration of industry in the 
United States that prevailed from the late 19th century to about the third quarter of the 20th century. 
Indeed, in 1900, about 4/5th of American manufacturing output was produced in this part of the country 
which comprised only 1/6th of its land area and a little over half its population (Klein and Crafts 2012). 
Another remarkable feature was its long persistence for almost a century. The causes of dominant 
concentration of manufacturing activities in the Manufacturing belt for about a century have been a 
point of interest for many scholars and it is clear that they most likely have a direct relationship to the 
causes of long-run regional inequalities. Various explanations have been put forward including factor 
endowments, proximity to suppliers and purchasers of intermediate goods (forward and backward 
linkages respectively), high market accessibility in the context of scale economies, and declining 
transport costs (Harris 1954, Perloff et al 1960, Meyer 1983, 1989, Krugman 1991, Kim 1995, Healey 
2015). A debate between factor endowment-type explanation (Kim 1995, 1999) and market access-type 
explanation revived by Krugman (1991) has yielded some robust conclusions. Klein and Crafts (2012) 
have tested the relative importance of both types of explanations by examining the persistence of the 
Manufacturing belt in 1880-1920 using an empirical model which subsumes both market-potential and 
factor-endowment arguments. The results show that it was market potential that was at the heart of the 
existence of the manufacturing belt, that it mattered more than factor endowments, and that its impact 
came through interactions both with scale economies and with both forward and backward linkages. 
Market potential explanation is intimately linked to transportation costs and we can better understand 
the development of regional inequalities income if we consider an explanation advanced by ‘new 
economic geography’ (Krugman 1991). This explanation, though stylized, offers valuable insights into 
a link between transportation costs and regional inequalities, and, as empirical evidence reviewed above 
suggested, should not be neglected.  In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the US began to 
rapidly industrialized, transportation costs began to fall dramatically especially with the advancements 
of railroads which were complementing the existing system of navigable river, coastal shipping, and 
canals. The concentration of manufacturing activities in Northeast and Midwest, which emerged in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, took advantage of it and locked their initial advantage in. Even 
though the West had abundance of natural resources and demographic structure favouring large labor 
supply, and South abolished slavery, it was not strong enough to pull manufacturing out of the 
Manufacturing belt for about a century. As a result, the rise and persistence of the manufacturing belt 
from the second half of the nineteenth to the second half of the twentieth century allowed Northeast and 
Midwest to forge ahead of the southern states, opening up large North-South per capita income gap.  
The dominance of the manufacturing belt started to erode noticeably from 1970s with manufacturing 
sector relocating to South. Indeed, the southern states experienced a boom in the decades after the World 
War II, allowing to them to catch up on per capita income with the rest of the US. The causes of this 
rather spectacular reversal of anaemic growth performance of now called the Sun Belt are still debated. 
As our earlier discussion would imply, structural change and factors of production were considered 
very importance source of growing productivity of South. However, amenities and housing supply were 
found to be important too (e.g. Glaser et al 2008). What about the role of transportation costs? 
Transportation costs continued to decline even further throughout the twentieth century as 
transportation sector witnessed improvements in technology, organization of transport network, the rise 
of trucking, and investment into new railroad infrastructure such as interstate highway system (Glaeser 
et al 2004). The implications of even lower transport costs for regional convergence are outlined by 
new economic geography models which predict that in interaction with high factor costs in 
geographically concentrated areas, regional disparities will narrow as manufacturing activities will 
relocate (e.g. Combes at al 2008). That seems to be a story of the manufacturing belt – high wage costs 
and strong unions were pushing the costs of production up, very likely above agglomeration benefits 
such as access to intermediate goods offered by the manufacturing belt. Once the transportation costs 
declined sufficiently enough not to make access to intermediate goods prohibitively expensive, 
industries began to relocate to South where the cost of labor was lower. 
Conclusion 
Overall, research on US regional activities has identified several channels which could explain long-
run development of regional income as presented earlier in this chapter. Narrowing down of regional 
disparities was due to the forces behind structural change, decline of transportation costs, and even the 
abundance of raw materials. At the same time, lack of convergence of especially the South before 1940 
was attributed to the inner working of labor markets, and the specifics of the southern institutions and 
the persisting effects of slavery. The slow-down of regional convergence since the 1980s was attributed 
mainly to the rising housing prices, high demand for skilled labor, and even the abundance of raw 
materials. Certainly, other factors are in play to explain the dynamism of US regional development and 
more work would need to be done to in the areas such as infrastructure, and state regulation and 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita across US States, 1880-2010 (1900GK$). 
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 Figure 2: Sectoral Employment Shares across US States, 1890-2010. 
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 Figure 3: The Coefficient of Variation of Location Quotient of Agriculture, Industry, and Services across US 
States, 1890-2010.  
 













1890 1930 1950 1980 2010
Agriculture Industry Services
 Figure 4: Locational Gini Coefficients across US States, 1880-2010. 
 
Sources: see text 
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 Table 5: σ-convergence among US states, 1880-2010 (population weighted coefficient of variation).  
Region 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
All US 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Less West 0.48 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Less South 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Source: see text 
             
  Note: The calculation of location Gini coefficients is based on GDP per capita in 1990GK$ 
 
 
 Table 6: Relative Per Capita Total Personal Income of the US States (United States=1)  
US State/US Region 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Alabama 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.48 0.43 0.47 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.84 
Arizona 2.84 1.15 1.57 1.26 1.08 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Arkansas 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.36 0.43 0.56 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.82 
California 2.27 1.97 1.78 1.80 1.53 1.44 1.42 1.24 1.24 1.18 1.18 1.10 1.10 1.07 
Colorado 2.20 2.08 1.55 1.34 1.12 0.92 0.91 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.06 1.00 1.12 1.06 
Connecticut 1.50 1.44 1.44 1.21 1.21 1.49 1.55 1.25 1.23 1.24 1.22 1.35 1.38 1.37 
Delaware 1.16 1.09 1.09 0.99 1.09 1.38 1.73 1.37 1.24 1.12 1.07 1.10 1.02 0.99 
Florida 0.45 0.76 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.96 
Georgia 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.83 0.91 0.94 0.87 
Idaho 1.73 1.12 1.07 0.99 0.92 0.79 0.77 0.88 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.81 0.80 
Illinois 1.18 1.25 1.27 1.34 1.27 1.30 1.27 1.22 1.18 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.05 
Indiana 0.85 0.77 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.93 1.01 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.85 
Iowa 0.96 0.95 0.97 1.13 0.87 0.81 0.83 1.02 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.95 
Kansas 0.68 0.88 0.92 1.06 0.90 0.74 0.71 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.98 
Kentucky 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.52 0.53 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.81 
Louisiana 0.81 0.66 0.62 0.69 0.66 0.57 0.61 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.87 0.78 0.78 0.93 
Maine 0.84 0.84 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.92 
Maryland 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.12 1.15 1.20 1.09 1.04 1.12 1.11 1.17 1.14 1.23 
Massachusetts 1.65 1.54 1.53 1.26 1.39 1.35 1.32 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.05 1.18 1.26 1.28 
Michigan 0.98 0.87 0.91 0.96 1.10 1.06 1.15 1.14 1.07 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.87 
Minnesota 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.09 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.08 1.07 
Mississippi 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.43 0.32 0.35 0.51 0.54 0.64 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.78 
Missouri 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 
Montana 2.59 2.43 2.02 1.47 0.96 0.80 0.95 1.10 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.77 0.88 
Nebraska 0.89 1.04 1.03 1.11 0.86 0.82 0.74 1.04 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.99 
Nevada 3.43 2.22 1.95 1.73 1.45 1.34 1.51 1.32 1.29 1.21 1.16 1.04 1.02 0.92 
New Hampshire 1.09 1.05 1.07 0.97 1.01 1.04 0.98 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.97 1.05 1.12 1.09 
New Jersey 1.44 1.38 1.41 1.22 1.25 1.37 1.39 1.20 1.18 1.18 1.16 1.26 1.28 1.28 
New Mexico 0.64 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.73 0.53 0.63 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.83 0.77 0.75 0.84 
New York 1.57 1.58 1.53 1.50 1.58 1.67 1.47 1.23 1.24 1.19 1.09 1.23 1.14 1.21 
North Carolina 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.41 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.71 0.71 0.80 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.88 
North Dakota - 1.03 1.04 0.93 0.70 0.50 0.59 0.92 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.84 1.07 
Ohio 1.01 1.02 1.10 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.11 1.06 1.05 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.91 
Oklahoma - 0.05 0.47 0.75 0.77 0.59 0.62 0.76 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.83 0.81 0.89 
Oregon 1.27 1.30 1.21 1.35 1.14 0.97 1.02 1.10 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.91 
Pennsylvania 1.28 1.23 1.25 1.08 1.14 1.15 1.10 1.03 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 
Rhode Island 1.55 1.47 1.48 1.23 1.30 1.28 1.27 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.02 0.97 1.05 
South Carolina 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.61 0.63 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.81 
South Dakota - 0.74 0.90 0.95 0.83 0.57 0.60 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.99 
Tennessee 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.88 
Texas 0.56 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.83 0.66 0.73 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.98 0.89 0.94 0.94 
Utah 0.77 1.02 0.90 1.01 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.81 0.81 
Vermont 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.91 0.93 1.00 
Virginia 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.65 0.62 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.93 1.00 1.05 1.04 1.11 
Washington 1.03 1.67 1.39 1.47 1.18 1.06 1.11 1.14 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.01 1.07 1.07 
West Virginia 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.73 0.79 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.80 
Wisconsin 0.88 0.80 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.96 
Wyoming 1.96 1.99 1.54 1.19 1.38 0.93 1.00 1.14 1.02 0.96 1.16 0.93 0.97 1.12 
 
              
Northeast 1.42 1.39 1.39 1.27 1.33 1.40 1.31 1.13 1.14 1.12 1.07 1.16 1.15 1.18 
Midwest 0.97 0.97 1.02 1.07 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.95 
South 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.64 0.75 0.78 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 
West 1.92 1.73 1.51 1.45 1.25 1.16 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.10 1.03 1.04 1.01 
               
Manufacturing belt region 1.18 1.16 1.20 1.15 1.20 1.23 1.20 1.10 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.08 1.07 1.08 
Rest of United States 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Source: see text 
              
 
 Figure 1: β-unconditional convergence among US states, 1880-2010.  
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